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1.

Introduction
In 1987, the Supreme Court held in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon that

investor claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were arbitrable.1 That
decision was soon followed by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
in which the Court overruled Wilko v. Swan and held that mandatory arbitration
provisions in brokerage customer agreements for claims under the Securities Act of 1933
are also enforceable.2 Since those decisions, virtually all brokerage customer agreements
contain a clause requiring disputes between the customer and the broker to be submitted
to arbitration. The vast majority of these arbitrations take place in a forum administered
by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), formerly known as the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). During the period studied here, the NASD
handled approximately 90% of customer claims against brokers (the remaining 10% were
handled by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)). The number of claims filed per
year fluctuates, averaging 5000 to 6000 cases and peaking at almost 9000 in 2003.3
Since 1996, the NASD/FINRA has handled approximately 70,000 claims.
The fact that arbitration is now ubiquitous in the securities industry makes it
difficult to evaluate the results of FINRA arbitrations; there is no alternative venue for
dispute resolution with which to compare the process.4 Despite the absence of solid
evidence on the the process, arbitration consistently has been criticized as favoring the

1

482 U.S. 220 (1987).
490 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1989) (holding arbitration clauses enforceable in Securities Act disputes).
3
This number includes disputes between firms in the securities industry and their registered
representatives.
4
See 2000 GAO Report regarding unpaid awards at 4-5. The inability of customers to pursue litigation as
an alternative precludes the type of study that is common in analyzing labor arbitrations in which the
arbitration outcomes are compared to the results of litigated cases. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart
J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud.
429, 451-52 (2004) (comparing arbitration and litigation results in employment discrimination cases).
2
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securities industry over the interests of investors.5 The inescapable fact is that the
arbitration process is run by the FINRA, so it is necessarily dominated by the
association’s members. The NASD created an Arbitration Policy Task Force in 1994 to
evaluate and respond to a number of criticisms, including claims that the system was
biased or industry-dominated. Although the NASD’s Task Force found no evidence of
bias, a number of its recommendations were designed to improve the perceived and
actual fairness of the system, leading to rules changes in 2004 and 2007, and increased
updating and affirmation by arbitrators that their disclosure is adequate.
The criticisms of FINRA’s process focus, in particular, on the use of industry
arbitrators—including, among others, those with present or recent employment ties with
securities brokerage firms. FIRNA arbitrations involving requested awards of $50,000 or
more are decided by panels of three arbitrators: one industry arbitrator and two public
arbitrators. Critics have challenged the definition of a public arbitrator as insufficiently
restrictive. In some cases, they have argued that the definition of a public arbitrator,
which includes individuals who have certain financial relationships , is insufficiently
stringent to preserve the neutrality of the public arbitrators. Most notably, the financial
thresholds do not exclude attorneys who commit only a small portion of their practice to
representing brokerage firms; such attorneys are classified as public. Moreover, some
commentators claim that the standards are inadequately enforced and that arbitrators with
significant conflicts or industry ties are able to serve as public arbitrators despite the
limitations of the rules.

5

See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenstern, Is this Game Already Over, N.Y. Times, June 18, 2006 (reporting
criticisms of arbitration process including industry-domination, arbitrator bias, inadequately disclosed
conflicts of interest, delays and more).
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Another criticism leveled at securities arbitration is that it allows arbitrators
excessive discretion. There are no real mechanisms for ensuring that arbitrators follow
the law. This opens the door for arbitrators to be swayed by their preferences in making
arbitration awards. Lawyers, by definition, are trained in the law, but that does not mean
that they will follow it if there is no monitoring of their decisionmaking.
This study attempts to shed some empirical light on the role that attorneys (termed
“attorney-arbitrators”) play as arbitrators in securities arbitration. FINRA does not
require that securities arbitrators be trained as lawyers. Nonetheless, attorneys dominate
the arbitration process and, in our sample, 82.2% of public arbitrators were attorneys.
Significantly, serving as a securities arbitrator is not a full time job; attorney-arbitrators
continue to play other roles, including serving as advocates for investors and brokerage
firms in securities arbitration. Do lawyers who serve in these roles differ in their
judgments from other securities arbitrators?
To explore the role of attorneys in securities arbitration, we analyze a dataset of
422 randomly selected arbitrators and their 6724 securities arbitration awards from 1992
to 2006. We find that attorney-arbitrators who have represented brokerage firms in other
securities arbitration cases are significantly less generous with arbitration awards. The
relation appears to be primarily driven by the presence of an attorney who has
represented a brokerage firm serving as the chair of an arbitration panel. We find no
significant relation between attorneys who have represented brokerage firms and award
size when that attorney is not the chair of the arbitration panel. Coalition effects,
nonetheless, exist. Although not important alone, other panel arbitrators with similar
views reinforce the preferences of a chair arbitrator. In contrast with our results for
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attorney-arbitrators who represent brokerage firms, we report that attorneys who
represent investors in arbitration proceedings are not more generous when they serve as
arbitrators, nor are arbitrators who represent both investors and brokerage houses.
Finally, we find evidence that arbitrators who have made political contributions to
Democratic candidates are significantly more generous in their arbitration awards than
their counterparts who have made no political contributions or who have contributed
exclusively to Republican candidates.
We proceed as follows. We lay out the background on FINRA arbitration
procedures and survey prior literature in Part 2. Part 3 sets forth our hypotheses. Part 4
describes our sample and variables, and reports the results of our empirical tests. Part 5
concludes.

2.

Background

2.1.

FINRA Procedures
FINRA rules establish two categories of arbitrators – public and non-public

(industry). Under the current procedures, claims for less than $25,000 are resolved
through a simplified procedure involving a single arbitrator who resolves the case without
a formal hearing. Claims for between $25,000 and $50,000 receive a hearing conducted
by a single arbitrator, although any party has the right to request a three person panel. If
the claim is heard by a single arbitrator, FINRA rules require that the arbitrator be a
public arbitrator unless the parties agree otherwise. Claims for $50,000 or more are
resolved by a panel consisting of three arbitrators.6 If the case is heard by a three person

6

FINRA has proposed raising this limit to $100,000. Proposed Rule Change to Amend Rule 12401 of the
Customer Code and Rule 13401 of the Industry Code to Raise the Amount in Controversy Heard by a
Single Chair-qualified Arbitrator to $100,000. SR-FINRA-2008-047
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panel, the rules provide that the panel will be composed of two public arbitrators and one
non-public (industry) arbitrator.
FINRA rules specify a variety of professional and personal characteristics that
result in an arbitrator being classified as industry rather than public. Under the rules now
in effect, current and former professionals in the securities industry as well as other
professionals with substantial industry ties may not be classified as public arbitrators.7
Persons who work as investment advisors, persons who work for an affiliate of a
securities firm, and persons with a parent, child or spouse in the securities industry do not
quality as public arbitrators.8 Public arbitrators are thus intended to be industry outsiders
or “neutrals.” Non-public arbitrators, commonly known as industry arbitrators, include
current and former brokers, bankers and other securities professionals. The category also
includes attorneys, accountants and other professionals who have devoted 20% or more
of their professional work to industry clients.9 The rules have been amended several
times, most recently in 200410 and 2007,11 in an effort to eliminate potential conflicts and

7

10308. Selection of Arbitrators
(5) “public arbitrator”
8
See FINRA, The Neutral Corner - April 2007,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/ResourcesforArbitratorsandMediators/GeneralInformationandR
eference/TheNeutralCorner/P019055 (indicating in response to inquiry that the acceptance of an unpaid
internship at a securities firm by an arbitrator’s adult child will disqualify that arbitrator as a public
arbitrator for a five year period).
9
10308. Selection of Arbitrators
(4) “non-public arbitrator”
10
The 2004 amendments (effective July 19, 2004) :
Increased from three years to five years the period for transitioning from a non-public to public
arbitrator after leaving the securities industry.
Clarified that the term “retired” from the industry includes anyone who spent a substantial part of
his or her career in the industry.
Prohibited anyone who has been associated with the industry for at least 20 years from ever
becoming a public arbitrator, regardless of how long ago the association ended.
Excluded from the public arbitrator roster attorneys, accountants, or other professionals whose
firms have derived 10 percent or more of their annual revenue in the previous two years from
clients involved in securities-related activities.
Provided that investment advisors may not serve as public arbitrators.
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biases from the category of public arbitrators. 12 In 2008, FINRA amended its rules to
prohibit an attorney, accountant or other professional from being classified as a public
arbitrator if the person’s firm derived $50,000 or more in annual revenue in the past two
years from professional services to a broker, brokerage firm or other industry client
relating to any customer disputes concerning an investment account or transaction.13
Since November 1998, arbitrators for FINRA arbitrations have been chosen
through a list selection system administered by the Director of Dispute Resolution,
termed the Neutral List Selection System (or NLSS).14 During most of the time period
involved in our study, the NASD provided the parties in each case with two separate lists,
one consisting of public arbitrators and the other consisting of non-public arbitrators, in a
roughly two-to-one ratio. At first the practice was to provide a list of 8 public arbitrators
and 4 non-public arbitrators, but this was later increased to 10 and 5, respectively. The
lists were generated by an NASD computer program using a rotational method, although
the computer eliminated arbitrators with obvious conflicts of interest. Along with the
Amended the definition of immediate family member to add parents, children, stepparents,
stepchildren, as well as any member of the arbitrator’s household (thus excluding persons with
immediate family members employed in the securities industry).
11
In 2005, the NASD amended the definition of public arbitrator to exclude individuals who work for (or
who have an immediate family member who works for) an entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under
common control with, a broker/dealer. The NASD also amended its rules so that individuals registered
through broker-dealers may not be public arbitrators, even if they are employed by a non-broker-dealer
(such as a bank). This amendment became effective on Jan. 15, 2007.
12
FINRA recently introduced a pilot program under which a limited number of cases will be decided by
panels consisting entirely of public arbitrators. Sara Hansard, Finra to try revamped arbitration panels,
Investment News, July 25, 2008. The program is an attempt to respond to criticisms that the inclusion of
an industry arbitrator results in awards that are biased against investors.
13
SEC, Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the Definition of Public Arbitrator, Sec. Exch.
Act. Rel. No. 54792 (March 19, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/2008/34-57492.pdf.
14
The NASD’s Neutral List Selection System (NLSS) went into effect on November 17, 1998. The NLSS
was proposed by the NASD Arbitration Policy Task Force as part of its 1996 Securities Arbitration Reform
Report and modeled after the list selection system used by the American Arbitration Association. The
report recommended that panels for larger cases continue to be composed of one industry member and two
public arbitrators. The report recommended improving the quality of arbitrators by increased arbitrator
compensation, better training, expanding the arbitrator pool and requiring arbitrator evaluation of copanelists. The report also made some highly controversial recommendations concerning the availability of
punitive damages in arbitration awards.
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lists, the parties were also provided with background information on each arbitrator,
including a copy of that arbitrator’s Arbitrator Disclosure Report. Parties were allowed
to request additional information on the arbitrators, and the NASD director was required
to forward that request to the arbitrators, although the arbitrators were not required to
respond.
Each party was allowed to strike an unlimited number of arbitrators on the list for
any reason. The parties each then ranked the remaining arbitrators, ranking the public
and non-public arbitrators separately. The NASD Director appointed a panel consisting
of the two public arbitrators and one non-public arbitrator who received the highest
combined rankings from the parties. If, after the parties’ strikes were exercised, an
insufficient number of arbitrators remained on the lists to fill the panel, the Director
completed the panel by appointing additional arbitrators whose names were produced
through computer selection.
The chair of the panel appears to exercise the greatest degree of control over the
arbitration proceedings and is typically responsible for the overall administration of the
proceeding including the resolution of discovery disputes, ruling on evidentiary issues,
and so forth.15 During the period of our study, the parties had the right, in the first
instance, to designate the chair of the panel by agreement, although, according to FINRA,
the parties agreed upon the designation of the chair only 20% of the time.16 If the parties
were unable to agree, the chair was appointed by the Director, and was to be the public

15

When it requested approval from the SEC to establish qualifications for panel chairs, FINRA stated that
“chairpersons . . . play a vital role in the administration of cases.” Self-Regulatory Organizations; National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1,
2, 3, and 4 Thereto To Amend NASD Arbitration Rules for Customer Disputes, Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No.
51856 (June 15, 2005), 70 FR 36442, 36445 (June 23, 2005).
16
Id. at 36445.

7
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2009

7

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 94 [2009]

arbitrator who received the highest combined ranking “as long as the person is not an
attorney, accountant, or other professional who has devoted 50% or more of his or her
professional or business activities, within the last two years, to representing or advising
public customers in matters relating to disputed securities or commodities transactions or
similar matters.” If this was the case, the Director was to appoint the other public
arbitrator as chair.
In no case was a non-public arbitrator to serve as chair unless the parties
consented. Moreover, even in cases in which the parties could not agree on the chair
designation, an arbitrator could not be appointed as chair unless the parties had selected
him or her to the panel. The infrequency with which the parties agreed upon the
designation of the chair suggests that the parties tend to have relatively less control over
the chair designation than the overall composition of the panel. The chair selection
process also limits a party’s ability to select for particular chair criteria – such as industry
expertise in a complicated case.17
Arbitrators are chosen from a pool of almost 7000 available arbitrators of which
approximately 58% are public arbitrators and 42% are industry arbitrators. Arbitrators
are paid $200 for each hearing session, with the chair receiving an additional $75/day.
Arbitrator candidates are not required to possess any particular qualifications beyond at
least five years of full-time, paid business or professional experience and at least two

17

In 2007, FINRA modified the list selection system in several ways. First, FINRA moved to a system in
which it maintains three separate rosters of arbitrators – public arbitrators, non-public arbitrators and chairqualified arbitrators. Lists of eight potential arbitrators are generated from each roster and sent to the
parties. The parties are now permitted only four strikes from each list rather than an unlimited number of
strikes, although additional arbitrators can be challenged for cause. The rationale for this change was to
reduce the frequency with which the generation of additional lists would be required. FINRA also shifted
from a rotational system to random selection to generate the lists.
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years of college level credits.18 Since 1993, however, FINRA has required new
arbitrators to go through its comprehensive basic arbitrator training program; since 1998,
new arbitrators have been required to pass an examination.19
FINRA offers a non-binding mediation program in addition to the more formal
arbitration procedure. During the period 2003-2007, according to FINRA’s statistics,
approximately 70-80% of claims filed were settled or resolved through means other than
an arbitrator decision, 3-4% of cases were resolved by arbitrators based on written
submissions and 18-24% were resolved after a formal hearing.20 Because our study
focuses on reported decisions – the only cases for which information is publicly available
– we necessarily face a selection problem, which we discuss in greater detail below.

2.2.

Prior Literature
Several commentators have attempted to evaluate the fairness of the FINRA

arbitration process. To date, these studies have been inconclusive. First, in the absence
of a basis for assessing the merits of the claims, studies of win rates or award ratios suffer
from the lack of a baseline with which to compare them.. Second, efforts to assess
potential arbitrator bias empirically are hampered by the lack of background information
on individual arbitrators.
18

http://www.finra.org/web/groups/med_arb/documents/mediation_arbitration/p017271.pdf (arbitrators
manual p. 1). The college credit requirement was added in 2003.
19
FINRA imposed additional new qualification requirements on chairs as part of its 2007 revisions (after
the period of our study). In addition to the requirement that chairs be public arbitrators, the rules now
provide that, to be eligible for the chairperson roster, arbitrators must have completed chairperson training
or have substantially equivalent training and experience and either (a) have a law degree, be a member of
the bar and have served as an arbitrator on at least two cases or (b) have served as an arbitrator on at least
three cases.
20
These numbers also include intra-industry disputes.
Parties may resolve their case through direct settlement or by participating in a FINRA mediation
process. See http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/index.htm (reporting
on cases resolved through direct settlement, mediation and withdrawal).
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One set of studies focuses on investor win rates and recoveries. In 1992, the
GAO published the results of a study of arbitration awards during an eighteen month
period in 1989 and 1990. The GAO found that claimants received an award of monetary
damages in 59% of arbitrations and received, on average, 61% of claimed damages.
Comparing this to AAA arbitrations in which claimants received awards in 60% of cases
and received an average of 57% of claimed damages, the GAO found no basis to
conclude that the arbitration process was systematically biased in favor of the industry.21
In 2000, the GAO published an updated reporting reflecting data from 1992 to 1998.
That study found that investor win rates had declined to an average of 51% over the time
period, but reasoned that this decline might be the result of an increase in settled claims
rather than a pro-industry bias, concluding that “the declining win rate could indicate
little or no change in the fairness of the arbitration process.” More recent data indicate
that the investor win rate has continued to decline. FINRA statistics show that investors
received an award of monetary damages or other non-monetary relief in 42% of the cases
decided in 2006, and 37% in 2007.
In the late 1990s, Gary Tidwell, then-Director of Neutral Training and
Development for NASD Regulation, supervised a survey of participant perceptions of the
fairness of the arbitration process. The study reviewed evaluations submitted by
investors in NASD arbitrations at the close of their hearings over a fifteen month period
between Dec. 1, 1997 and April 1, 1999. According to the Tidwell report, 93.49% of
respondents agreed that their cases were handled fairly and without bias and 91.67% of
respondents rated the arbitrators as good or excellent. The response rate for the survey,

21

See 1992 GAO report comparing percentage to claimant win rate of 60% in AAA arbitrations.
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however, was only 10-20%. Moreover, the evaluations were frequently submitted before
receiving the award.
In 2002, Professor Michael Perino was retained by the Securities & Exchange
Commission to prepare a report analyzing Arbitrator Conflict Disclosure requirements in
SRO arbitrations.22 The Perino Report considered whether the then-existing SRO
disclosure requirements were sufficient to assure investors that arbitrators were neutral
and impartial. Perino did not conduct his own empirical analysis but, relying on the
GAO and Tidwell studies described above, concluded that “the available evidence on
arbitration outcomes does not suggest that arbitrators tend to have pro-industry biases.”
Perino also concluded that existing disclosure requirements were generally adequate, but
he recommended that the arbitrator rules be amended “to emphasize that all conflict
disclosures are mandatory.” He also recommended that the definition of public arbitrator
be reexamined, in particular to assess whether an arbitrator should be disqualified based
on the industry ties of a non-household family member. Finally, he recommended
additional research be conducted on investor attitudes concerning arbitration.
Jill Gross and Barbara Black recently released a study, commissioned by the
Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, surveying participants on their perceptions
of fairness in arbitration.23 Participants generally believed that arbitrators were
competent, but the participants were divided on the impartiality of the arbitrators and the
overall fairness of the process. Customers, however, were considerably more skeptical

22

Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission Regarding Arbitrator Conflict Disclosure
Requirements in NASD and NYSE Securities Arbitrations (Nov. 4, 2002). The purpose of the report was
to determine whether California’s newly adopted ethics standards regarding disclosure of arbitrator
conflicts of interest should be applied to SRO arbitrations.
23
Perceptions of Fairness of Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study (2008).
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than other participants, and a majority of customers said that they would be more
satisfied with the process if arbitrators provided an explanation of the award.
A working paper by Jiro Kondo examines the role of arbitrator bias and expertise
in the selection of arbitrators.24 Using data from NASD arbitrations from 1991 to 2004,
Kondo found that lawyers and pro-industry arbitrators are more likely to be selected to
serve on panels. The pro-industry bias of arbitrator selection, however, occurred only
after the NASD rule change in 1998 moving from NASD selection of panels to the list
selection system. He concluded that party control of selection results in the brokerage
firms, which are more likely to be repeat players, dominated the selection process and
producing panels more likely to contain arbitrators who tend to side with large brokerage
firms. Kondo concluded that the increased probability that an attorney would get selected
after the 1998 reforms reflected a tendency for parties to select more for expertise after
the reforms.
Edward S. O’Neil and Donald R. Solin studied almost 14,000 NASD and NYSE
arbitrations that occurred between 1995 and 2004.25 The study reports that investor win
rates – cases in which the investor received an award of any amount – dropped from a
high of 59% in 1999 to 44% in 2004. In cases in which investors received an award, the
study found they recovered roughly 50% of the amount claimed. Cases involving larger
claims and larger brokerage firms resulted in smaller investor recoveries. The authors
also calculated expected recoveries and compared those recoveries to the costs of
pursuing an arbitration claim including forum fees, legal fees and the cost of expert
24

Self-Regulation and Enforcement in Financial Markets: Evidence from Investor-Broker Disputes at the
NASD (2006).
25
Mandatory Arbitration of Securities Disputes – A Statistical Analysis of How Claimants Fare (2007).
The researchers conducted their research without the cooperation of the NASD and in fact were forced to
engage in litigation in order to obtain the right to use the award data for their study.

12
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art94

12

Choi et al.:

witnesses. The authors concluded that an investor’s chance of receiving a substantial
award against a major brokerage firm in SRO arbitration was approximately 12%, with
expected recovery rates increasing for smaller claims and against smaller firms.26 The
study did not focus on arbitrator characteristics or panel composition.
A number of empirical studies have examined arbitration outside the securities
context. Labor arbitrations have received the most extensive analysis. Empirical
research has, for the most part, found little difference between plaintiff win rates in
litigation versus arbitration,27 but most studies have found that litigated cases produce
higher average awards.28 Even with the litigation available as a basis for comparison,
these studies acknowledge that the absence of a reliable baseline makes it difficult to
reach normative conclusions about the fairness of arbitration relative to litigation.
Researchers also note that litigated cases may differ systematically from cases that are
arbitrated, limiting the value of comparing outcomes.29 In addition, as with our study, the
research in this area is hampered by lack of access to information about settled cases.30
One additional concern that might be traced to the role that attorneys play in
arbitration is the extent to which arbitration has come to resemble litigation. Extended
26

Indeed, the damages awarded by the arbitrator may overstate the investor’s actual recovery. In June
2000, the GAO issued a report revealing that a substantial percentage of SRO awards had not been paid.
Securities Arbitration: Actions Needed to Address Problem of Unpaid Awards (2000). The GAO’s report
indicated that about 80% of the $161 million awarded to investors, primarily in the form of NASDadministered awards, was unpaid. The NASD responded to this report by establishing procedures to
monitor the payment of awards and, in its 2003 follow-up report, the GAO indicated that the percentage of
unpaid rewards had declined substantially. Nonetheless, the number of unpaid awards, particularly by
defunct brokerages, remained significant.
27
See, e.g., David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment
Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1557, 1567-69 (2005) (summarizing
empirical research comparing win rates in arbitration versus litigation).
28
Id. at 1576 (“The proposition that arbitration generates lower average awards than litigation finds ample
scholarly support”).
29
See, e.g., id. at 1574 (“litigation and arbitration case streams differ, and, as a result, damage awards likely
differ as well.”).
30
But see Sherwyn, et al. supra (studying employment discrimination cases resolved during mediation,
conciliation and settlement negotiations).
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discovery, accompanied by discovery disputes and abuses, is widely reported.31 Not
surprisingly, the length of time required to resolve a claim through the arbitration process
has increased substantially. SRO arbitration was originally viewed as preferable to
litigation in part because it was relatively fast and inexpensive.32 The overall turnaround
time for FINRA arbitration now averages around sixteen months in cases for which a
hearing is held. Although this is still significantly faster than litigation,33 it is far from an
expedited process.

3.

Hypotheses
We principally focus on the role that attorneys play as arbitrators, and in

particular how their role as advocates may influence their arbitration awards. We posit
that attorneys who represent brokerage firms and brokers in arbitration are likely to be
skeptical of investors’ claims for compensation generally, leading them to be less
generous with arbitration awards. Conversely, we predict that attorneys who represent
investors in arbitration are likely to be skeptical of the integrity of brokerage firms and
brokers, leading them to be more generous with arbitration awards. We predict no effect
for attorneys who represent both brokerages and investors. We call this the Financial
Interest hypothesis.

See Gary Shorter, Securities Arbitration: Background and Questions of Fairness, at 3 (CRS Report for
Congress, April 26, 2005).
32
David Ruder, Elements of a Fair and Efficient Securities Arbitration System, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1101
(1998).
33
See Marc E. Lackritz, Testimony before Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of
Representatives (March 17, 2005), available at
http://www.sifma.org/legislative/testimony/archives/Lackritz3-17-05.html.
31
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H1: Attorney-arbitrators who represent brokerage firms (investors) will
make lower (higher) arbitration awards.
We also posit that the ideological views of attorney-arbitrators will affect the
awards they grant in arbitrations.34 Because arbitrators need to follow existing law only
loosely, do not need to provide reasons, and face only a remote possibility of judicial
review, arbitrators have large discretion in handling any particular case. That discretion
may allow the political perspectives of attorney-arbitrators to influence their awards. We
call this the Ideology hypothesis.

H2: Attorney-arbitrators with a strong Democrat political preference
grant significantly different awards compared with attorney-arbitrators
with a strong Republican political preference.
The effect of these predilections is likely to be magnified when the arbitrator
serves as the chair of the arbitration, given the important role that that the chair plays in
managing the proceedings, admitting evidence, etc. Moreover, the effect is also likely to
be amplified if another arbitrator on the panel shares the same background with the chair.
We call this a Coalition effect.
H3: Attorneys who represent brokerage firms (investors) will make
lower (higher) arbitration awards when they serve as chairs.
H4: Attorneys who represent brokerage firms (investors) will make
lower (higher) arbitration awards when they serve with other arbitrators
with the same background.

34

This hypothesis is premised on an extensive literature examining the role of ideology in judicial
decisionmaking. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic
Debates about Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 743 (2005) (summarizing empirical literature).
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4.

Empirical Tests

4.1

Description of Dataset
We obtained NASD arbitration awards from the FINRA arbitration awards online

site and from the LEXIS database. To generate a random set of arbitrators, we randomly
selected 15 arbitration awards per month for the years 1998 to 2000; we refer to this as
our “small sample.” Some of the arbitrations that resulted in awards in the 1998 to 2000
period were filed prior to 1998, allowing us to generate a starting sample that includes
arbitrators who were active prior to the 1998 reforms. We identified the chair in each
arbitration award involving an investor as the claimant; these chairs constitute our sample
of arbitrators. Because of FINRA’s selection procedures for chairs, these are almost all
public arbitrators (we excluded non-public chairs). We focus on chairs to select those
arbitrators who are more likely to have influence over arbitrations. Using this procedure,
we obtained a total of 422 arbitrators.
For each of the 422 arbitrators, we then collected information on their arbitration
awards as provided in the FINRA and LEXIS databases from 1/1/1992 to 12/31/2006.
We only looked at arbitration awards involving an investor-claimant. Panel A of Table 1
reports the number of arbitration awards in our sample by year.
<<Insert Table 1 About Here>>
As reported in Panel B of Table 1, the arbitration proceedings took place in 44
different jurisdictions (including Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia). The
jurisdictions with the largest number of arbitrations were California (1,247), New York
(969), and Florida (565).
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4.2

Variable Description
The dependent variable for the majority of our tests is the Compensation Ratio,

defined as the compensatory award (or settlement if reported) divided by the requested
compensation amount. 35 One potential weakness in this measure is that the claimant
decides how much to request as compensation, which creates room for exaggeration.
Claimants may request punitive or exemplary damages as well as damages for pain and
suffering. However, these are listed separately in the arbitration award which allows us
to exclude them from our measure of the compensatory damages. The compensatory
damages will typically turn on the number of securities involved in a particular
transaction multiplied by the losses the investor-claimant incurred on the securities.
Because information on the number of securities transacted (as well as price change on
the shares) is also available to the broker or brokerage firm respondent, claimants have
less leeway to inflate the requested compensation amount.
A number of factors may affect the Compensation Ratio. To control for these
other factors, our models include a number of variables relating to the subject matter of
the dispute, selection of the dispute for arbitrator resolution, panel makeup, award, and
state in which the arbitration occurred.
Subject matter controls include indicator variables for six common areas of
arbitration. Suitability is defined to equal 1 if the arbitration involved a suitability claim,
including claims relating to “know your customer,” NYSE Rule 405,36 and NASD Rule

35

We use Compensation Ratio rather than the absolute level of compensation awarded as our dependent
variable because we lack data on the actual damages suffered by the claimants. Using the ratio rather than
the raw figure mitigates the omitted variable problem.
36
NYSE Rule 405, the “know your customer” rule, requires member firms to use “due diligence to learn
the essential facts relative to every customer [and] every order.” NYSE Rule 405.
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2310 issues,37 and 0 otherwise. Other subject matter indicator variables include Churning
(a churning, excessive trading, or excessive commission claim), Unauthorized Trades,
Failure to Execute (a failure to buy or sell as directed), Misrepresentation, and
Conversion (a claim of theft, conversion, unauthorized withdrawals, or self-dealing). The
base category consists of claims involving a non-specified breach of contract or violation
of fiduciary duty. Panel A of Table 2 reports on the frequency of the subject matter
claims in our arbitration sample. Misrepresentation (68%) and suitability (50%) claims
are the most common.
<<Insert Table 2 About Here>>
We also include controls to address selection effects. Panel B of Table 2 reports
on the settlements in our sample. The vast majority of settlements are unreported; our
sample includes a small number of settlements that are reported – typically because only
some of the respondents have settled.38 In those cases, the reported decision may or may
not report the settlement terms. The variable Reported Settlement is defined to equal 1
where the arbitration resulted in a full or partial settlement and the settlement amount was
reported as part of the arbitration award (and included therefore in the Compensation
Ratio variable) and 0 otherwise. Unreported Partial Settlement is defined to equal 1
where the arbitration resulted in an unreported partial settlement and the award (if any)
against the remaining non-settling respondents was reported and 0 otherwise. All other
things being equal, we expect that awards in the case of an Unreported Partial Settlement
should be lower due to the settlement by a subset of the respondents.
37

NASD Rule 2310, the “suitability requirement,” states that “In recommending to a customer the
purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such
customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.”
38
The strength of cases that settle may be different from those that do not settle.
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Panel C of Table 2 provides summary statistics on our opinion controls. Opinion
controls focus on characteristics of the claim that may affect the Compensation Ratio.
Claimed Compensation is included because the absolute level of compensation requested
may affect the Compensation Ratio awarded. Arbitrators may be less willing to grant a
higher Compensation Ratio for larger Claimed Compensation amounts, all other things
being equal, simply because they are reluctant to award large sums. Large claims are
more likely to be inflated by the claimant than small ones. Moreover, arbitrators may
perceive a large award against an individual broker or small firm as posing a risk of
insolvency. A Compensation Ratio of 20% for a $100,000 claim produces only a
$20,000 award – the same Compensation Ratio for a claim of $100 million is likely to be
more difficult to obtain. The mean Claimed Compensation for our sample is $620,000,
but the median is a much more modest $91,000. The Compensation Ratio is less skewed,
with a mean award of 32% of the claim and a median of 11%. To account for possible
non-linearity in the relationship between Compensation Ratio and Claimed
Compensation, we also include a squared term for Claimed Compensation.
The number of arbitrators is correlated with the size of the Claimed Compensation
amount. FINRA typically requires a panel of three arbitrators for Claimed Compensation
amounts of over $50,000. The overwhelming majority of the awards in our sample came
from three-arbitrator panels. We also include a control variable for arbitrator experience,
Inexperienced, set to one if the award is from the first year that the arbitrator appeared in
the dataset, and zero otherwise. Arbitrators new to the job may be reluctant to make large
awards because it may reduce their chances for future selection.
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Several opinion controls deal with the strength of the case; stronger cases should
result in a higher Compensation Ratio. Unfortunately, we have no direct measure of the
strength of the claimant’s case, so we rely on three proxies. Respondent Failed to Appear
is defined to equal 1 if the any of the respondents failed to appear at the arbitration
hearing and 0 otherwise. Respondents may not appear if their case is weak; alternatively,
failing to appear itself may lead the arbitrators to view the respondents’ case as less
meritorious. In most cases a default award will be entered against the non-responding
party. At least one respondent failed to appear in 12% of the awards in our sample. We
use a request of punitive damages by the claimant (Claimed Punitive) as a proxy for a
relatively strong case. Although punitive damages can be (and are) claimed in
connection with each of the claim types in our classification, we hypothesize that
claimants request punitive damages in cases involving more egregious wrongdoing or
where they have hard evidence of fraud or other culpable misconduct. Many awards
request an unspecified amount of punitive damages. This measure may be relatively
noisy, as some lawyers will request punitive damages in every case, while others never
do. We defined Claimed Punitive as equal to 1, however, only when the claimant has
made the punitive damages claim with some specificity. Two situations fall within this
definition: (a) where we observe the claimant requests a positive dollar amount of
punitive damages—fixing in the arbitrator’s minds a precise amount of punitive damages
and (b) where we observe the actual award of punitive damages, indicating that the
claimant took actions during the arbitration hearings to press their claim for punitive
damages.
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Our final proxy for the strength of the case, Claimed Expungement, is equal to 1
if the respondents requested that the CRD record of any of the respondent-brokers be
expunged and 0 otherwise. FINRA maintains CRD records for active brokers reflecting
customer complaints and disciplinary proceedings. Arbitrators may, at their discretion,
choose to expunge the arbitration claim from the CRD records for a broker involved in
arbitration; expungement has the effect of erasing the record of the claim from the
broker’s CRD file. Although NASD rules adopted in 2004 provide that arbitrators may
only grant expungement requests under specific conditions,39 a recent PIABA study
found that expungement remains common.40 We treat a respondent as requesting CRD
expungement: (a) where we observe the respondent requesting the expungement in the
award summary and (b) where we observe the actual award of CRD expungement,
indicating that the respondent actively pursued expungement during the arbitration
hearings. We treat a request for CRD expungement as an indication that the respondents’
case was stronger relative to the claimants’ case. We consider this proxy to be the
noisiest of the three in light of the consistent criticisms leveled at arbitration panels for
awarding expungement without an adequate basis.
Finally, our models include state controls for the state in which the arbitration
hearing took place, which we treat as exogenous to the variables in our dataset. We

39

In 1999, the NASD temporarily halted expungement by arbitrators after complaints were raised. In 2004,
it adopted new rules providing that arbitrators could expunge a broker’s record only if “arbitration panel
found that an investor’s allegations had been factually impossible or false, or that the accused broker had
not been individually involved in the matter.” Lynnley Browning, Site That Tracks Brokers Questioned on
Erased Cases, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/14/business/14regulate.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
40
Shepherd, Smith & Edwards, Study Says Securities Arbitrators Often Expunge Investor Settlements from
Brokers’ Records, avail. at
http://www.stockbrokerfraudblog.com/2007/10/new_study_alludes_to_securitie.html (Oct. 9, 2007)
(reporting results of study of 2006 expungement decisions). The New York Times reported that, in 2005,
FINRA expunged 907 customer complaints from brokers’ records, or 13%. Browning, supra note __.
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measure our state controls as of 1999, the mid-point of our dataset. The state controls
include the median household state income (State Income) and the average partner salary
for the state (Partner Income). States with higher income may have a different investor
clientele than states with lower incomes. Higher law firm salaries correlates with an
increased opportunity cost for qualified individuals to serve as arbitrators, leading
arguably to lower quality arbitrators. We also include indicator variables for the three
states with over 500 arbitrations taking place in the state (New York, California, Florida).

4.3

Financial Interest
We estimate the following equation for each award using ordinary least squares

and robust standard errors clustered by individual arbitrator:
Compensation Ratioi = α + ß1iAttorneyi +
+ ß2iAttorney_Investori + ß3iAttorney_Brokeragei
+ ß4iIndustry Arbitrator Backgroundi
+ ß5iInexperiencedi + ∑ßji Subject Matterji
+ ∑ßkiOpinion Controlski + ∑ßliState Controlsli
+ Year Effects + εi
To test the Financial Interest Hypothesis (H1), we include a series of independent
variables to test the importance of a financial relationship among attorneys who serve as
arbitrators. The base case is defined to be non-attorney arbitrators. Attorney is defined as
1 if the arbitrator is an attorney and 0 otherwise. Attorney_Investor is defined to equal 1
if the arbitrator has acted as an attorney in other arbitrations and represented investors in
more than 75% of these arbitrations and 0 otherwise. Attorney_Brokerage is defined to
equal 1 if the arbitrator acted as an attorney in other arbitrations and represented
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brokerage firms or brokers in more than 75% of these arbitrations and 0 otherwise.41
Industry Arbitrator Background is equal to 1 if the arbitrator was designated as an
industry arbitrator in other arbitration proceedings and 0 otherwise. (Designation as a
public or industry arbitrator can and does change.) We include an independent variable
for whether the arbitration is in the arbitrator’s first year in our dataset (excluding 1992,
the first year covered by our data set) (Inexperienced). The model also includes subject
matter, opinion, and state controls.
<<Insert Table 3 About Here>>
Panel B of Table 3 reports the results of our first model. We find partial support
for the Financial Interest Hypothesis (H1). The coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage is
negative and significant at the <1% level. Arbitrators who acted as an attorney for a
brokerage firm in other arbitration proceedings correlate with a 7.5 percentage point
lower arbitration award (measured as a percentage of the claimed compensation). The
coefficient on Industry Arbitrator Background is also negative, although significant at
only the 10% level. Arbitrators with an Industry Arbitrator Background correlate with a
5 percentage point lower arbitration award. These results are consistent with the view
that prior employment relationships may affect arbitration awards. Arbitrators who act as
attorneys for brokerage firms or brokers may tend to side with brokerage firms and
brokers in customer arbitration proceedings, perhaps because those attorneys have a
more sympathetic view of the industry generally. Alternatively, attorneys who have
worked for brokerage firms may have greater industry expertise, which causes them to be
more skeptical of investors’ claims. The available data do not allow us to assess the

41

Note that this variable is likely underinclusive, as it does not capture non-arbitration representation of
industry clients. This underinclusion biases against finding any significant result.
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merits of claims, so we cannot exclude the possibility that lower rewards are a more
accurate resolution of the claims. We do not find a corresponding effect for attorneys
who represent investors; the coefficient for Attorney_Investor is insignificant.
We also find that inexperienced arbitrators make smaller awards. The coefficient
on Inexperienced is negative and significant at the 10% level. Inexperienced arbitrators
correlate with a 3.4 percentage point lower arbitration award to claimants, which is
consistent with the proposition that those early in their arbitration careers may hesitate in
making large awards, perhaps in the hope that they will get selected more often by
brokerage firms in future cases.42
The influence of a financial interest may turn on the extent of an attorneyarbitrator’s relationship with brokerage firms and brokers. To assess this question, we
divide the Attorney_Investor and Attorney_Brokerage variables in Model 1 based on
whether the attorney-arbitrator represented a client in at least 3 other arbitrations (for
arbitrators who acted at least once as an attorney in other arbitration proceedings) there is
the median number of arbitration representations (We denote these as “Many Cases,” and
attorney arbitrators who represented clients in two or fewer arbitrations as “Few Cases”).
Model 2 of Panel B reports the results of our modified model. Note from the model that
the coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and significant at the
<1% level (corresponding to a 9.6 percentage point reduction in the arbitration award); in
contrast, the coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases) is negative but not
42

We divided our subject matter categories into subjective claims (suitability, churning, and
misrepresentation claims) and more objective claims (unauthorized trades, failure to execute, and
conversion). We then added to Model 1 an indicator variable for a subjective claim (Subjective) as well as
interaction terms between Subjective and the Attorney_Investor and Attorney_Brokerage variables.
Unreported, the coefficient on Subjective was negative and insignificant (at the 13.1% level), suggesting
that arbitrators are more skeptical of such claims. The coefficients on Subjective x Attorney_Investor and
Subjective x Attorney_Brokerage, however, were both insignificant.
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significant. The Financial Interest Hypothesis holds primarily for attorney-arbitrators
who served as counsel in more than the median number of arbitrations.43
The coefficients for many of the control variables are as expected. The
Compensation Ratio increases when a respondent failed to appear and where claimants
sought punitive damages; stronger cases result in higher arbitration awards. Conversely,
the Compensation Ratio is lower when the respondents sought an expungement of a
broker’s CRD record.
Settled cases tend to result in a higher Compensation Ratio. The coefficient on
Reported Settlement is positive and significant at the <1% level. This suggests that
brokerage firms and brokers tend to settle the strongest cases. Even awards for nonsettling respondents in cases that involve an unreported partial settlement reflect a higher
Compensation Ratio.44

43

As a robustness test, we re-estimate Model 2 using a Tobit model to control for the limitation that the
dependent variable, Compensation Ratio, ranges only from 0 to 1. Reported as Model 3 of Panel B of
Table 3, the Tobit model generates the same qualitative results as Model 2, supporting the Financial
Interest Hypothesis with respect to attorneys who represent brokers or brokerage firms. Note though that
the coefficient on Inexperienced is not significantly different from zero in this model.
As an additional robustness test, we re-estimate Model 1 of Panel B of Table 3 for only those
arbitration awards that did not result in a partial or full settlement. Unreported, these models returned
qualitatively the same results as the models in Table 3. We also re-estimate Model 1 of Table 3, replacing
the Claimed Compensation^2 term with an indicator variable, Million, for whether the requested
compensation amount was greater than one million dollars. Unreported, the model models returned
qualitatively the same results as the models in Table 3.
Finally, we re-estimate Model 2 using a logit model and replacing the dependent variable with
Award, defined as equal to 1 if the arbitration resulted in positive compensation to the claimant and 0
otherwise (with errors clustered by arbitrator). In the logit model, Reported Settlement and Unreported
Partial Settlement were dropped as independent variables because both correlated perfectly with a positive
award. Reported as Model 4 of Panel B of Table 3, the logit model generates the same qualitative results as
Model 2, again supporting the Financial Interest Hypothesis. As with Model 2, however, the coefficient on
Inexperienced is also insignificantly different from zero. As an additional robustness test, we re-estimate
Model 4 with an Award indicator variable equal to 1 if an award equal to 5% or more of the claimed
compensation amount was given and 0 otherwise. Unreported, the re-estimated model returned the same
qualitative results as Model 4, supporting the Financial Interest Hypothesis.
44
As a robustness test, we separately estimate Model 2 of Panel B of Table 3 solely for arbitrations
involving three-arbitrator panels, and for one-arbitrator panels, in each case excluding the number of
arbitrator variable. Unreported, we obtain the same qualitative results as in Model 2. The coefficient on
Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and significant at the 5% level in the three-arbitrator panel
model, and negative and significant at the <1% level, in the one-arbitrator panel model. Unlike Model 2,
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It is possible that financial influence operates differently in large cases, in which
the stakes are higher. To test the importance of case size, we re-estimated Model 2,
creating two subsamples for arbitrations with (a) the median or lower claimed
compensation amount and (b) greater than the median claimed compensation amount.
Unreported, the coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and
significant at the <1% level only for the subsample with the median or lower claimed
compensation amount. 45 This finding suggests that arbitrators’ financial interests matter
only for those arbitration involving smaller dollar amounts. One possibility is that larger
cases correlate with more careful screening of arbitrator lists by claimants’ attorneys..

4.4

Ideology
The findings described above may not result from the experience of arbitrators

serving as attorneys in other cases but may instead reflect the underlying world views of
the arbitrators. The lack of written opinions and minimal judicial review may give more
latitude to arbitrators’ ideological views.47 Attorneys who are skeptical of compensation
may choose to represent brokerage firms rather than investors. Arbitrators who are
skeptical of regulation generally may be less generous with arbitration awards. An

however, the coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases) is negative and significant at the <1% level
for the one-arbitrator panel model. Thus, for one arbitrator panels, attorneys with brokerage firm ties
correlate with reduced awards even where their brokerage firm relationship is less extensive. One
arbitrator panels may give the single arbitrator greater leeway.
45
We also estimate this model using only three-arbitrator panels (excluding the number of arbitrators
variable). Unreported, we obtain the same qualitative results as for the model with all size arbitrator
panels. The coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and significant at the <1% level
only for the median or lower claimed compensation amount arbitrations.
47
FINRA has recently proposed giving the parties the option of requesting an explanation for the
arbitrator’s decision. Proposed Rule Change to Amend Rules 12214, 12514 and 12904 of the Code of
Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes and Rules 13214, 13514 and 13904 of the Code of Arbitration
Procedure for Industry Disputes to Require Arbitrators to Provide an Explained Decision upon the Joint
Request of the Parties. SR-FINRA-2008-051.
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arbitrator who is more pro-investor may side with the customers and grant higher
arbitration awards on the same set of facts.
To assess whether ideology affects arbitration awards, we use political
contributions to construct a proxy for the likely political outlook of the attorneyarbitrators in our sample. We hypothesize that arbitrators who contribute to the
Democratic party are more likely to be sympathetic to investors, and that arbitrators who
contribute to the Republican party are more likely to favor the brokerage industry. We
searched the opensecrets.org website for contributions by our attorney-arbitrators to
federal political candidates. If an arbitrator contributed money only to Republicans, we
labeled the arbitrator as a Republican; arbitrators who contributed to only Democrats we
labeled as Democrat. Panel A of Table 4 reports on the breakdown of our attorneyarbitrators based on this classification. Because we focus on those who actually
contribute money to political campaigns, arbitrators who we term either Republican or
Democrat likely not only identify with that party, but also hold strong views. Note that
the proxy is underinclusive; the overwhelming majority of arbitrators (78.6%) made no
reported political contributions, but this does not mean that they lack an ideological
perspective.48
We estimate the following equation for each arbitration award using ordinary
least squares and robust standard errors clustered by each individual arbitrator:

48

Of the 75 non-attorney arbitrators, only 2 (or 2.67%) are identified as Democrat; the remaining nonattorney arbitrators are either Republican or not identified with a particular party. In contrast, of the 347
attorney arbitrators, 57 (or 16.43) are identified as Democrat (difference significant at the <1% level).
Among subsets of attorneys there is less distinction based on identification as a Democrat. Of the 16
attorneys with a brokerage firm relationship, 3 (or 18.75%) are identified as Democrat; of the 45 attorneys
with an investor relationship, 9 (or 20.00%) are identified as Democrat. The difference is not statistically
significant.
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Compensation Ratioi = α + ß1iAttorneyi + ß2iDemocrat_Attorneyi
+ ß3iRepublican_Attorneyi
+ ß4iAttorney_Investor (Few Cases)i + ß5iAttorney_Investor (Few Cases)i
+ ß6iAtty_Brokerage (Few Cases)i + ß7iAtty_Brokerage (Many Cases)i
+ ß8iIndustry Arbitrator Backgroundi + ß9iInexperiencedi
+ ∑ßji Subject Matterji + ∑ßkiOpinion Controlski + ∑ßliState Controlsli
+ Year Effects + εi
The model modifies Model 2 of Panel B of Table 3 with the addition of
independent variables for whether an attorney-arbitrator contributes to Democrats or
Republicans (Democrat_Attorney and Republican_Attorney).
<<Insert Table 4 About Here>>
Model 1 of Panel B of Table 4 reports our results. The coefficient on
Democrat_Attorney is positive and significant at the <1% level (corresponding to a 4.9
percentage point increase in the arbitration award measured as a percent of the claimed
compensation); the coefficient on Republican_Attorney is negative and insignificant,
albeit on a relatively small number of observations. The difference between the two
coefficients is significant at the 5% level. Democrat attorney arbitrators give
significantly higher awards than Republican attorney arbitrators, supporting the view that
ideology has a significant effect on arbitration awards. Model 1 also reports that the
coefficient for Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) continues to be negative and
significant at the <1% level (corresponding to a 9.8 percentage point decrease in the
arbitration award).49

49

As a robustness test, we re-estimate Model 1 of Panel B of Table 4 for only those arbitration awards that
did not result in a partial or full settlement. Unreported, the model returned qualitatively the same results
as the models in Table 4. We also re-estimate Model 1 of Panel B of Table 4, replacing the Claimed
Compensation^2 term with an indicator variable, Million, for whether the requested compensation amount
was greater than one million dollars. Unreported, the models returned qualitatively the same results as
Model 1 in Panel B of Table 4.
Model 2 of Panel B of Table 4 re-estimates the model with the use of a Tobit regression to control
for the limitation that the dependent variable, Compensation Ratio, ranges only from 0 to 1. Model 2
reports results qualitatively similar to Model 1. The coefficient on Democrat_Attorney is positive and now

28
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art94

28

Choi et al.:

To test the importance of arbitration size, we re-estimated Model 1 for the
subsamples of arbitrations with (a) the median or lower claimed compensation amount
and (b) greater than the median claimed compensation amount. Unreported, the
coefficient on Democrat_Attorney is positive and significant at the <1% level and the
coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and significant at the <1%
level only for the subsample with the median or lower claimed compensation amount.
Ideology and financial interests matter only for those arbitration involving smaller dollar
amounts.50

4.5.

Importance of the Arbitration Chair
For our main sample of 6724 arbitrations we only collect data on our starting set

of arbitrators. Given the labor required we do not collect information on the other
arbitrators (if any) on the arbitration panel. The lack of information on the other

significant at the 5% level. Model 3 of Panel B of Table 4 uses logistic regression replacing Compensation
Ratio with the Award indicator variable as the dependent variable (equal to 1 if a positive award was
received and 0 otherwise). Model 3 reports that same qualitative results as Model 1, supporting the
hypothesis that the ideology of the arbitrators affect arbitration outcomes. We re-estimate Model 3 of Panel
B of Table 4 with an Award indicator variable equal to 1 if an award equal to 5% or more of the claimed
compensation amount was given and 0 otherwise). Unreported, the re-estimated model returned the same
qualitative results as Model 3 of Panel B of Table 4.
As an additional robustness test, we re-estimate Model 1 of Panel B of Table 4 solely for
arbitrations involving three-arbitrator panels, and for one-arbitrator panels, in each case excluding the
number of arbitrator variable. Unreported, we obtain the same qualitative results as in Model 1. In both
models, the coefficient on Democrat_Attorney is positive and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient
on Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and significant at the 5% level in the three-arbitrator
panel model, and negative and significant at the <1% level in the one-arbitrator panel model. Unlike Model
1, however, the coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases) is also negative and significant at the <1%
level in the one-arbitrator panel model.
50
As a robustness test, we re-estimated Model 1 of Panel B of Table 4 for only three-arbitrator panels
(excluding the number of arbitrators variable) creating two subsamples for arbitrations with (a) the median
or lower claimed compensation amount (with the median measured solely for three-arbitrator panel
arbitrations) and (b) greater than the median compensation amount. Unreported, we obtain similar
qualitative results as for the model with all size arbitrator panels. The coefficient on Democrat_Attorney is
positive and significant at the 5% level only for the median or lower claimed compensation amount
arbitrations. The coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and significant at the <1%
level only for the median or lower claimed compensation amount arbitrations. On the other hand, the
coefficient on Arbitrator_Brokerage (Few Cases) is now positive and significant at the 10% level.
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arbitrators introduces a possible omitted variable problem. We address this potential
problem in two ways. First, in this section, we code for whether the arbitrator in our
sample is the chair of the arbitration proceeding or not. Second, in the next section, we
collect more detailed information on the arbitration and all the arbitrators for a random
sub-sample of our arbitrations.
To analyze whether other attorney characteristics, such as education and
experience, affect the level of arbitration awards, we collect additional information from
Martindale-Hubbell about the attorneys who serve as arbitrators in our sample. As
proxies for general attorney skill, we create two indicator variables: Atty_Rated, which is
coded as 1 if Martindale-Hubbell reported an “AV” or “BV” rating for the attorneyarbitrator, and 0 otherwise; and Atty_Top_LawSchool, which is coded as 1 if the lawyer
graduated from a law school ranked in the top ten by U.S. News & World Report in 1991,
and 0 otherwise. As proxies for familiarity with the subject matter of securities
arbitration, we create two additional indicator variables: Atty_Securities_Practice, coded
as 1 if securities law is listed as within the attorney’s practice in Martindale-Hubbell, and
0 otherwise; and Atty_Solo_Practice, which is coded as 1 if a lawyer practices alone,
rather than with a firm. Securities experience is not a dominant characteristic among our
attorney arbitrators. Many are drawn to securities arbitration based on their experience
with arbitration generally, such as in employment law.51
We hypothesize that the chair has the ability disproportionately to influence the
outcome of the arbitration. This hypothesis is consistent with the greater compensation
paid to chairs and FINRA’s decision to impose additional qualification requirements on

51

Because these data are collected from internet-based sources and we have limited identifying
information about our arbitrators, the professional data are incomplete and noisy.
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the chair and to modify the chair selection process. Among the duties assigned to the
arbitrator who serves as chair position are resolving pre-trial motions and controlling the
presentation of evidence and other aspects of the arbitration proceeding. These
procedural steps may influence the ultimate outcome; moreover, the chair’s central role
in the proceedings may lead the other arbitrators to defer to him/her.
To test the importance of the chair’s influence, we estimate the following
equation for each award using ordinary least squares and robust standard errors clustered
by arbitrator:
Compensation Ratioi = α + ß1iChair_Attorneyi + ß2iChair_Democrat_Attorneyi
+ ß3iChair_Republican_Attorneyi + ß4iChair_Atty_Ratedi
+ ß5iChair_Atty_Top_LawSchooli + ß6iChair_Atty_Securities_Practicei
+ ß7iChair_Atty_Solo_Practicei
+ ß8iChair_Attorney_Investor (Few Cases)i
+ ß9iChair_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)i
+ ß10iChair_Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases)i
+ ß11iChair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)i
+ ß12iChair_Industry_Arb_Backgroundi
+ ß13iOther_Attorneyi + ß14iOther_Democrat_Attorneyi
+ ß15iOther_Republican_Attorneyi + ß16iOther_Atty_Ratedi
+ ß17iOther_Atty_Top_LawSchooli + ß18iOther_Atty_Securities_Practicei
+ ß19iOther_Atty_Solo_Practicei
+ ß20iOther_Attorney_Investor (Few Cases)i
+ ß21iOther_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)i
+ ß22iOther_Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases)i
+ ß23iOther_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)i
+ ß24iOther_Industry_Arb_Backgroundi
+ ß25iInexperiencedi + ∑ßji Subject Matterji + ∑ßkiOpinion Controlski
+ ∑ßliState Controlsli + Year Effects + εi
The model divides the arbitration as attorney variables (Attorney_Investor,
Attorney_Brokerage) and the arbitrator characteristic variables into two groups based on
whether the arbitrator was the chair in the particular arbitration proceeding. The division
allows us to test whether the position of the arbitrator matters in the arbitration. Model 1
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of Table 5 reports our results for this regression. Model 2 of Table 5 re-estimates Model
1 using a Tobit model. Model 3 re-estimates Model 1 using a logit model and the Award
dependent variable.
<<Insert Table 5 About Here>>
Model 1 of Table 5 reports that the coefficient on Chair_Democrat_Attorney is
positive and significant at the <1% level. Chair_Democrat_Attorney correlates with a 5.6
percentage point increase in the arbitration award measured as a percent of the claimed
compensation. The coefficient on Other_Democrat_Attorney is not significantly
different from zero. Similarly, in the Tobit model (reported in Model 2) and the logit
model (reported in Model 3), the coefficients on Chair_Democrat_Attorney are positive
and significant at the 5% level while the coefficients on Other_Democrat_Attorney are
insignificant. For ideology, only the chair arbitrator position is important in our model.
Similarly, Model 1 of Table 5 reports that the coefficient on
Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and significant at the <1% level.
Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) correlates with a 9.1 percentage point decrease
in the arbitration award. The coefficient on Other_Attorney_Brokerage is also negative
and significant at the 5% level (corresponding to a 10.3 percentage point decrease in the
arbitration award). In the Tobit model reported in Model 2, Chair_Attorney_Brokerage is
negative and significant at the <1% level while the coefficient on
Other_Attorney_Brokerage is insignificant. In the logit model reported in Model 3, the
coefficients for both Chair_Attorney_Brokerage and Other_Attorney_Brokerage are
negative and significant at the <1% level. Summing up, for affiliation with the securities
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industry, the chair arbitrator position is significant in all three of our models. The other
arbitrator position is significant only in Models 1 and 3.52
Our test omits the background and ideology of the other arbitrators on the
arbitration panel. The results (particularly for ideology) do suggest, however, that the
arbitrator who matters most is the chair, although industry affiliation involving other
arbitrators may also influence arbitration awards.53
Our tests may be affected by sample selection bias; that is, our results are
contingent upon an award being reported. However, the vast majority of cases are
settled, and cases resulting in unreported settlements may differ significantly from cases
that are resolved through a hearing. Most importantly for our purposes, particular
arbitrator characteristics may lead to a greater likelihood of settlement. Cases rarely
settle before discovery is conducted, with most cases settling just prior to the hearing.
Thus, claimants know the identity of the arbitrators when they agree to settle. Claimants
may realize that attorney-arbitrators who represent brokers and brokerage firms, for
example, favor brokers and brokerage firms in their awards. Claimants may settle such

52

We re-estimate Model 3 of Table 5 with an Award indicator variable equal to 1 if an award equal to 5%
or more of the claimed compensation amount was given and 0 otherwise). Unreported, the re-estimated
model returned the same qualitative results as Model 3 of Table 5,although the coefficient for
Other_Attorney_Brokerage, while still negative, is significant only at the 5% level.
To test the importance of arbitration size, we re-estimated Model 1 for the subsamples of
arbitrations with (a) the median or lower claimed compensation amount and (b) greater than the median
claimed compensation amount. Unreported, the coefficient on Chair_Democrat_Attorney is positive and
significant at the 5% level and the coefficient on Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and
significant at the <1% level only for the subsample with the median or lower claimed compensation
amount.
53
As a robustness test, we re-estimate Model 1 of Table 5 for only those arbitration awards that did not
result in a partial or full settlement. Unreported, these models returned qualitatively the same results as
Model 1 of Table 5. We also re-estimate Model 1 of Table 5, replacing the Claimed Compensation^2 term
with an indicator variable, Million, for whether the requested compensation amount was greater than one
million dollars. Unreported, the models returned qualitatively the same results as Model 1 of Table 5.
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cases rather than risk a low award. The omission of such settlements from our sample
may cause our tests to understate the influence of the attorney-arbitrators in our sample.
To ascertain whether our arbitrator characteristic variables of interest correlate
with the propensity to settle, we test whether certain arbitrator characteristics correlate
with an increased propensity to settle using our sample of settlements and arbitration
awards.54 We estimate a logit model where Settlement is the dependent variable and
equal to 1 where there is a settlement and 0 otherwise. We use the same independent
variables as in our arbitrator characteristic model in Table 5 above with one change. We
drop the Reported Settlement and Partial Unreported Settlement independent variables.
Unreported, if the Chair is an attorney who has securities practice experience, the
likelihood of settlement is significantly increased. None of the other coefficients on the
arbitrator characteristic variables is significantly related to the propensity to settle,
including the industry affiliation and ideology related variables. This analysis is not an
entirely adequate substitute for a two-stage selection model, but in the absence of a viable
instrument for such a model, it does give some reassurance in the validity of our results.

4.7.

The Mix of Arbitrators
To assess the importance of the mix of arbitrators on an arbitration panel, we

narrow our sample to the initial small sample used to select our arbitrators. This sample
consists of 429 randomly selected awards from 1998 to 2000. Panel A of Table 6
summarizes the number of arbitrations in our sub-sample by year.
<<Insert Table 6 About Here>>
54

Kondo (2007) employs a similar procedure to assess the importance of sample selection bias in his
sample of arbitrations. This approach is imperfect because cases involving a partial settlement may not be
representative of other settled cases.
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For each arbitration in our sub-sample, we collect similar attorney and political
contribution information for the other arbitrator members of the panel. We expand on the
opinion controls used in the full sample model to include the number of hearings in the
arbitration as a measure of the complexity of the arbitration (Number of Hearings). We
also include the length of the arbitration opinion as another measure of case complexity
(Opinion Length). To control for the strength of the presentation of the case, we add
indicator variables coded as 1 if the claimant is represented by counsel (Claimant
Attorney Present) or the respondent is represented by counsel (Respondent Attorney
Present), respectively, and 0 otherwise. Better presentation may lead to better outcomes.
These variables may also correlate with case strength – claimants with strong cases are
more likely to be able to attract an attorney to work on a contingency fee basis, while
respondents with no defenses may not bother to hire counsel.
As an additional control, we include Top_Accused_Brokerage_Firm, set to 1 if
any of the respondents was one of the top 10 brokerage (as measured in 1998).55 A large
brokerage firm may have repeat player advantages and greater resources in defending
those complaints, leading to lower awards. Descriptive statistics on these additional
variables are presented in Panel B of Table 6, along with the descriptive statistics for the
small sample for the variables used in the prior models.
We estimate the following equation for each arbitration award using ordinary
least squares and robust standard errors clustered by individual arbitrator:

55

Our source for this is the SIA Securities Industry Yearbook for

(date).
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Compensation Ratioi = α + ß1iChair_Attorneyi +
+ ß2iChair_Democrat_Attorneyi + ß3iChair_Republican_Attorneyi
+ ß4iChair_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)i
+ ß5iChair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)i
+ ß6iChair_Industry_Arb_Backgroundi
+ ß7iTop Accused Brokerage Firmi
+ ß8iInexperiencedi + ß9iClaimant Attorney Presenti
+ ß10iRespondent Attorney Presenti
+ ∑ßji Subject Matterji + ∑ßkiOpinion Controlski
+ ∑ßliState Controlsli + Year Effects + εi
Model 1 of Table 7 reports our results (using an ordinary least squares model with errors
clustered by individual arbitrator).
<<Insert Table 7 About Here>>
Note in Model 1 that the Chair_Republican_Attorney coefficient is negative and
significant at the 10% level. Chair_Republican_Attorney correlates with an 8.5
percentage point decrease in the arbitration award measured as a percent of the claimed
compensation. Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) coefficient is significant at the
5% level (and negative). Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) correlates with a 13.2
percentage point decrease in the arbitration award. In contrast, the coefficient on
Chair_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases) is not significantly different from zero. The
results from our large sample tests carry forward to our sub-sample.
Note from Model 1 that the coefficient on Top Accused Brokerage Firm is
negative and significant at the <1% level (corresponding to a 14.1 percentage point
reduction in the arbitration award). Larger firms appear to be able to defend their actions
better, resulting in lower compensation awards. Note also that the coefficient on
Claimant Attorney Present is positive and significant at the 5% level (corresponding to a
10.3 percentage point increase in the arbitration award). Not surprisingly, claimants that
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hire attorneys fare better. This may be because attorneys help present the claimants’ case
more persuasively, because claimants who know they have a stronger case will expend
the resources to hire an attorney, or because attorneys perform a screening function in
agreeing to take a case. Similarly, the coefficient on Respondent Attorney Present is
negative and significant at the <1% level (corresponding to a 20.3 percentage point
decrease in the arbitration award). Respondents who hire an attorney pay lower
compensation awards.56
To test the importance of the other non-industry arbitrators, we divide our
financial interest and ideology variables based on whether the Chair arbitrator sits on the
same panel with a non-industry arbitrator of the same persuasion (denoted as “with
Coalition”) or not (denoted as “no Coalition”). Model 2 reports the results with solely the
financial interest variable divided based on panel composition and Model 3 reports the
results with both fiancial interest and ideology variables so divided.
Model 2 reports that the coefficient on Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)
No Coalition is negative but not significant at conventional levels. The coefficient on
Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) with Coalition is negative and significant at the
5% level (corresponding to a 21.9 percentage point decrease in the arbitration award).
The pairing of an arbitrator chair who is a brokerage attorney with another similar

56

To test the importance of arbitration size, we re-estimated Model 1 for the subsamples of arbitrations
with (a) the median or lower claimed compensation amount and (b) greater than the median claimed
compensation amount. Unreported, the coefficient on Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) coefficient
is significant at the 10% level (and negative) only for the subsample with the median or lower claimed
compensation amount. The coefficient on Claimant Attorney Present is positive and significant at the <1%
level only for the subsample with the median or lower claimed compensation amount. The coefficient on
Respondent Attorney Present is negative and significant at the 5% and <1% levels in the subsamples with
the median or lower claimed compensation amount and greater than the median claimed compensation
amount respectively. Lastly, the coefficient on Top Accused Brokerage Firm is negative and significant at
the <1% level only for the subsample with the median or lower claimed compensation amount. Thus, most
of the effects we identify appear significant only for the smaller arbitration awards.
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arbitrator results in significantly lower awards for investor-claimants.57 This evidence
suggests that a coalition of like-minded arbitrators result in a greater shift in the
arbitration award than where only a single arbitrator has a background characteristic that
may affect the arbitration outcome.
Model 3 reports similar results as in Model 2. In addition, the coefficients on
Chair_Republican_Attorney No Coalition and Chair_Democrat_Attorney No Coalition
are both insignificant at conventional levels. The coefficient on
Chair_Republican_Attorney with Coalition is negative and significant at the 5% level
(corresponding to a 16.7 percentage point reduction in the arbitration award). Thus we
find mixed evidence that Chair arbitrators are more likely to decide according to their
ideology if joined with a similar minded non-industry arbitrator.58

4.8.

Testing the Impact of the NASD Reforms
Our final set of tests relates to the reforms adopted in 1998 and 2004 by the

NASD. Those reforms were intended to enhance the fairness of the process, thereby
helping investors, but they sought to achieve that goal through very different
mechanisms. The 1998 reforms shifted the selection of arbitrators from the NASD to the
parties, putting the onus on parties to exclude arbitrators that were perceived as biased.
The 2004 reforms narrowed the definition of a public arbitrator, excluding individuals

57

As a robustness test, we re-estimate the models of Table 7 for only those arbitration awards that did not
result in a partial or full settlement. Unreported, these models returned qualitatively the same results as the
models in Table7. We also re-estimate the models of Table 7, replacing the Claimed Compensation^2 term
with an indicator variable, Million, for whether the requested compensation amount was greater than one
million dollars. Unreported, the models returned qualitatively the same results as the models in Table 9.
58
As a robustness test, we attempted to re-estimate the models of Table 7 with Tobit models. However, the
models failed to converge to a full set of coefficients and t-statistics for the coefficients.
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with a broader range of personal and professional ties to the securities industry from
serving as public arbitrators.
The effect of the 1998 reforms thus depends largely on the knowledge and
sophistication of the parties.59 If brokerage firms, as repeat players, had greater access to
information about arbitrators and greater resources to spend on the selection process, the
1998 reforms might benefit them more than claimants. On the other hand, many
claimants’ attorneys are also repeat players who compile and maintain data on individual
arbitrators. The greatest disparity is likely to be found in cases in which the claimant is
not represented by counsel. The 2004 reforms seem more directly aimed at potential
conflicts of interest, although it is unclear if the new limitations were significant.
Kondo (2007) found that the 1998 reforms tilted the selection of arbitrators
toward more pro-brokerage firm arbitrators, suggesting that party control over panel
composition favored repeat players over one-shot claimants. Kondo’s study faces the
problem that the pool of all available arbitrators is not publicly available, because the
NASD does not release information about the pool of arbitrators beyond reporting the
percentage of public and industry arbitrators. Thus, Kondo’s tests are unable to control
for the background pool of available arbitrators which may have shifted over time.
Kondo also reports that more attorneys are selected as arbitrators after the 1998 reforms,
leading him to conclude that expertise increased among arbitrators after the 1998
reforms.

59

An extensive literature, sparked by Marc Galantar’s influential article, identifies the advantages that
repeat players have in litigation. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L.& Soc. Rev.. 95 (1974). Scholars have applied the same analysis to
arbitration. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 Employee
Rts. & Employment Pol’y J. 189 (1997) (examining repeat player effect in labor arbitration).
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Given the data problems posed for testing selection, our tests focus on how
arbitrators changed their behavior in response to the incentives created by the reforms. If,
for example, the reforms gave brokerage firms greater clout, we would expect arbitrators
to reduce their awards against brokerage firms in the post-reform time period in hopes of
remaining attractive to brokerage firms in future cases. Accordingly, we pose both these
hypotheses in null form.

H5:

The 1998 reforms had no significant effect on the incentives of arbitrators to side

for (or against) brokerage firms and brokers.
H6:

The 2004 reforms had no significant effect on the incentives of arbitrators to side

for (or against) brokerage firms and brokers.

To test the impact of the 1998 and 2004 reforms, we re-estimate Model 1 of Panel
B in Table 4 using the full 1992-2006 sample, excluding arbitrations commenced in 1998
and 2004. For each model in Table 3 we remove the year indicator variables and
substitute two indicator variables, Post 1998 Reforms and Post 2004 Reforms, for
whether the arbitration is initiated after 1998 or 2004. We remove all arbitrator specific
variables and instead use arbitrator fixed effects. The use of arbitrator fixed effects
allows us to control for arbitrator characteristics in assessing the impact of the 1998 and
2004 reforms. Arbitrator fixed effects allows us to examine how any specific arbitrator
changed his or her awards subsequent to the 1998 and 2004 reforms in response to the
incentives created by these reforms. Model 1 of Table 8 reports our results, using an
ordinary least squares model with errors clustered by each individual arbitrator.
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<<Insert Table 8 About Here>>
From Model 1, note that the coefficient for the 1998 reforms is negative and
significant at the <1% level (corresponding to a 4.6 percentage point reduction in the
arbitration award measured as a percent of the claimed compensation). Thus, greater
party involvement in the selection process correlates with a reduction in the size of
investor arbitration awards. Although it is difficult to assign causality, this evidence
undermines the claim that this reform assisted investors. We can speculate that brokerage
firms, as repeat players in the process, may have had an advantage in collecting
information about arbitrators, thus allowing the firms to use the selection process more
strategically. Arbitrators may have reduced the size of their awards in an effort to be
attractive to brokerage firms in future cases.
The coefficient for the 2004 reforms, which more unambiguously were intended
to help investors, is insignificant. We find no evidence that the 2004 reforms tilted the
balance toward investors or brokers and brokerage firms one way or the other. It is
important to note that because we are testing arbitrator fixed effects, we do not capture
the possibility that the 2004 reforms changed the composition of the pool. At the same
time, it does not appear that the adoption of the reforms, which were motivated by claims
of pro-industry bias, caused continuing arbitrators to change their awards.
To test the importance of arbitration size, we re-estimate Model 1 for the
subsamples of arbitrations with (a) the median or lower claimed compensation amount
and (b) greater than the median claimed compensation amount. Unreported, the
coefficient on the 1998 reform indicator variable is negative and significant at the <1%
level only for the subsample of arbitrations with greater than the median claimed
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compensation amount. Brokerage firms may have used information about arbitrators
more strategically after the 1998 reforms – focusing primarily on larger arbitration award
cases where the investment in using such information was most cost justified.
To assess the impact of the 1998 reforms on cases with varying strength, we
added interaction terms between the Post 1998 Reform and the three case strength
variables (Respondent Failed to Appear, Claimed Punitive, and Claimed Expungment) to
Model 1 of Table 8. Unreported, the coefficient on Post 1998 Reform remains negative
but now is significant at only the 10.4% level. The interaction term between Post 1998
Reform and Claim Punitive is negative and significant at the <1% level (the coefficients
on the other case strength interaction terms are not significantly different from zero).
This finding suggests that the negative impact of the 1998 reforms on investor awards
occurred disproportionately for stronger investor claims.
Some arbitrators in our sample started as arbitrators after the 1998 reforms. As a
robustness test, we re-estimate Model 1 of Table 8 using only arbitrators who started
prior to 1998 (reported as Model 2). Model 2 reports the same qualitative results as
Model 1. As an additional robustness test, we re-estimate Model 1 using a Tobit random
effects model (using arbitrator effects). Model 3 reports the same qualitative results as
Model 1 for the Tobit random effects model.60 Lastly, we re-estimate Model 1 using a
logit model with an indicator (Award) for whether the arbitration resulted in any
compensation for the claimant as the dependent variable (reported as Model 4). Unlike

60

As a robustness test, we re-estimate Model 1 of Table 8 for only those arbitration awards that did not
result in a partial or full settlement. Unreported, the model returned qualitatively the same results as in
Model 1. We also re-estimate Model 1 of Table 8 replacing the Claimed Compensation^2 term with an
indicator variable, Million, for whether the requested compensation amount was greater than one million
dollars. Unreported, the model returned qualitatively the same results as in Model 1.
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the other three models, the coefficient on Post 1998 Reform is not significantly different
from zero in Model 4.61

5.

Conclusion
Both industry connections and ideology affect arbitration awards. We report

evidence that attorney-arbitrators are influenced by their experience representing brokers
or brokerage firms in other arbitrations. Attorneys who represent brokers or brokerage
firms render significantly lower arbitration awards when they serve as arbitrators. Those
attorney-arbitrators with strong political views also award systematically different
arbitration awards. Democrat attorney-arbitrators award significantly greater awards than
Republican attorney-arbitrators. These effects appear to be largely driven by smaller
awards.
The 1998 reforms correlate with a reduction in overall awards for any given
arbitrator. Party control over the selection of the arbitrators appears to increase
arbitrators’ incentives to cater to the interests of brokers and brokerage firms. Perhaps
brokers and brokerage firms, as repeat players, are better able to assess and strike less
sympathetic arbitrators. On the other hand, investors appear able to focus on obvious
conflicts of interests.
Generally, our findings show that arbitrator characteristics affect arbitration
outcomes. Our limited ability to determine whether the differences in results are due to
bias, expertise, or other factors suggests a need for greater transparency in the arbitration

61

We re-estimated Model 4 of Table 8 with an Award indicator variable equal to 1 if an award equal to 5%
or more of the claimed compensation amount was given and 0 otherwise). Unreported, the re-estimated
model returned the same qualitative results as Model 4 of Table 8.
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process, including increased disclosure about arbitrator backgrounds and greater
explanation of case awards.
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Appendix
APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable

Definition

Attorney_Investor

Indicator variable equal 1 if the arbitrator has acted as an
attorney in other arbitrations and represented investors in
more than 75% of these arbitrations and 0 otherwise.

Attorney_Brokerage

Indicator variable to equal 1 if the arbitrator acted as an
attorney in other arbitrations and represented brokerage
firms or brokers in more than 75% of these arbitrations
and 0 otherwise.

Industry Arbitrator
Background

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator was
designated as an industry arbitrator in other arbitration
proceedings and 0 otherwise

Inexperienced

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the award in question was
decided in the first year that the arbitrator’s awards appear
in the dataset (other than in 1992) and 0 otherwise.

Suitability

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration involved a
suitability claim, including claims involving “know your
customer”, NYSE Rule 405, and NASD Rule 2310 issues,
and 0 otherwise.

Churning

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration involved a
churning, excessive trading, or excessive commission
claim and 0 otherwise.

Unauthorized Trades

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration involved an
unauthorized trading claim and 0 otherwise.

Failure to Execute

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration involved a
claim that the broker or brokerage firm failed to execute a
transaction, failed to monitor an account properly,
improperly executed a transaction, or engaged in
activities that resulted in errors in a customer account and
0 otherwise.

Misrepresentation

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration involved
misrepresentation, fraud, failure to disclose, Rule 10b-5,
common law fraud, or deceptive sales tactic claim and 0
otherwise.
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Conversion

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration involved a
theft, conversion, unauthorized withdrawals, or selfdealing claim and 0 otherwise.

Claimed Compensation

Amount of claimed compensation in dollars by the
arbitration claimants.

Compensation Ratio

The total amount of compensation award divided by the
claimed compensation amount.

Award

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration resulted in
positive compensation to the claimant and 0 otherwise.

Number of Arbitrators

Number of arbitrators involved in the arbitration.

Respondent Failed to Appear

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the any of the respondents
failed to appear at the arbitration hearing and 0 otherwise.

Punitive Damages

Indicator variable equal to 1 if punitive damages were
imposed on any of the respondents in the arbitration
award and 0 otherwise.

CRD Expungement

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CRD records of any of
the respondent-brokers was expunged and 0 otherwise.

Reported Settlement

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration resulted in a
full or partial settlement and the settlement amount was
reported and 0 otherwise.

Unreported Partial Settlement Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration resulted in a
partial settlement and the settlement amount was not
reported (but the award for the non-settling respondents
was reported) and 0 otherwise.
Chair_Ratio

Number of arbitration in which a specific arbitrator
served as chair divided by the total number of arbitrations
for the specific arbitrator

State Income

The median household income for the state in 1999.

Partner Income

The average partner salary reported for 1999 for the state.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
Panel A
Year

Percent

1992

Number of Arbitration
Awards
331

1993

316

4.70

1994

324

4.82

1995

424

6.31

1996

614

9.13

1997

620

9.22

1998

849

12.63

1999

538

8.00

2000

434

6.45

2001

299

4.45

2002

291

4.33

2003

403

5.99

2004

557

8.28

2005

496

7.38

2006

228

3.39

Total

6724

100.00

4.92
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Table 1 Continued
Panel B
State

# of Awards

Percent

State

# of Awards

Percent

AK

4

0.07%

MO

112

1.99%

AR

9

0.16%

MT

1

0.02%

AZ

125

2.22%

NC

123

2.19%

Al

1

0.02%

NE

31

0.55%

CA

1,247

22.19%

NJ

7

0.12%

CO

228

4.06%

NM

39

0.69%

CT

7

0.12%

NV

57

1.01%

DC

102

1.81%

NY

969

17.24%

FL

565

10.05%

OH

171

3.04%

GA

110

1.96%

OK

21

0.37%

HI

24

0.43%

OR

64

1.14%

IA

2

0.04%

PA

198

3.52%

ID

1

0.02%

PR

2

0.04%

IL

121

2.15%

SC

5

0.09%

IN

14

0.25%

TN

36

0.64%

KS

1

0.02%

TX

316

5.62%

KY

54

0.96%

UT

31

0.55%

LA

79

1.41%

VA

39

0.69%

MA

78

1.39%

VT

1

0.02%

MD

53

0.94%

WA

73

1.30%

MI

309

5.50%

WI

66

1.17%

MN

123

2.19%

WV

1

0.02%
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Table 2
Panel A
Type of Claim

Number of Awards

Percent

Suitability

3385

49.76%

Churning

1169

17.19%

Unauthorized Trades

1675

24.63%

Failure to Execute

1241

18.24%

Misrepresentation

4627

68.02%

Conversion

295

4.34%

Base Category (Breach of
and/or Fiduciary Duty)

206

3.03%

Panel B
Outcome

Number of Awards

Percentage

No Settlement

5965

88.7

Settlement

759

11.3

Reported

51

0.8

Unreported Partial Settlement

211

3.1

Unreported Full Settlement

497

7.4

6724

100.0

Total

Panel C
Variable

Mean

25%

Median

75%
0.273

Standard
Deviation
12.628

Claimed Comp. ($ millions)

0.620

0.025

0.091

Compensation Ratio

0.324

0.000

0.112

0.656

0.391

Inexperienced

0.064

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.244

Number of Arbitrators

2.616

3.000

3.000

3.000

0.783

Respondent Failed to Appear

0.121

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.326

Punitive Damages

0.044

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.205

CRD Expungement

0.155

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.362

Median State Income (1999)

43248.9

39927.0

43393.0

47203.0

4018.9

Median Partner Income (1999)

234647

228080

217790

246380

30097
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Table 3
Attorneys as Arbitrators
Panel A
Status
Attorney

Number of Arbitrators
347

Percent
82.2%

Attorney_Investor

45

10.7%

Attorney_Brokerage

16

3.8%

Not Attorney

75

17.8%

Total

422

100.0%

Panel B
Variables

Model 1
OLS w/
Errors
Clustered by
Arbitrator

Model 2
OLS w/
Errors
Clustered by
Arbitrator

Model 3
Tobit

Model 4
Logit
(Dep Var:
Award=1 if
positive
award and 0
otherwise)

Attorney

-0.020
(-1.300)

-0.020
(-1.300)

-0.064*
(-2.050)

-0.194+
(-1.690)

Attorney_Investor

-0.005
(-0.190)

Attorney_Brokerage

-0.075**
(-3.160)
-0.016
(-0.460)

-0.051
(-0.920)

-0.235
(-1.090)

Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases)

0.006
(0.170)

0.015
(0.270)

0.078
(0.510)

Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)

-0.030
(-0.490)

-0.079
(-0.760)

-0.310
(-0.810)

Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)

-0.096**
(-5.100)

-0.254**
(-3.460)

-0.640**
(-5.770)

Attorney_Investor (Few Cases)

Industry Arbitrator Background

-0.050+
(-1.860)

-0.049+
(-1.810)

-0.138*
(-2.520)

-0.363*
(-2.350)

Inexperienced

-0.034+
(-1.880)

-0.034+
(-1.850)

-0.068
(-1.530)

-0.063
(-0.510)

Suitability

-0.011
(-0.980)

-0.011
(-0.970)

-0.021
(-0.910)

0.036
(0.530)
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-0.023+
(-1.850)

-0.023+
(-1.830)

0.029*
(2.430)

0.029*
(2.440)

Failure to Execute

-0.007
(-0.520)

-0.007
(-0.510)

-0.006
(-0.190)

0.034
(0.420)

Misrepresentation

0.016
(1.520)

0.015
(1.500)

0.045+
(1.810)

0.180**
(2.740)

Conversion

0.055*
(2.020)

0.056*
(2.040)

0.116*
(2.240)

0.197
(1.210)

-0.012**
(-4.100)

-0.012**
(-4.110)

-0.033**
(-4.180)

-0.026+
(-1.660)

0.000**
(4.010)

0.000**
(4.010)

0.000**
(3.020)

0.000
(0.280)

Number of Arbitrators

-0.023**
(-3.290)

-0.023**
(-3.270)

-0.021
(-1.420)

0.129**
(3.460)

Respondent Failed to Appear

0.269**
(17.200)

0.269**
(17.210)

0.533**
(16.620)

1.386**
(14.150)

0.033**
(3.220)

0.034**
(3.260)

0.067**
(2.780)

0.160*
(2.590)

Claimed Expungment

-0.109**
(-8.180)

-0.109**
(-8.170)

-0.339**
(-9.700)

-1.052**
(-12.140)

Reported Settlement

0.243**
(4.940)

0.243**
(4.960)

0.525**
(4.690)

Unreported Partial Settlement

0.208**
(6.700)

0.208**
(6.700)

0.454**
(8.010)

Median State Income

0.000
(0.020)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(-0.570)

0.000
(-1.150)

Median Partner Income for State

0.000+
(-1.950)

0.000*
(-1.970)

0.000+
(-1.770)

0.000
(-0.600)

New York

-0.026
(-1.190)

-0.027
(-1.230)

-0.059
(-1.240)

-0.137
(-0.860)

California

0.007
(0.430)

0.007
(0.420)

0.010
(0.310)

-0.040
(-0.360)

Florida

0.013
(0.670)

0.009
(0.440)

0.014
(0.320)

-0.061
(-0.530)

0.434*

0.752

Churning
Unauthorized Trades

Claimed Compensation
Claimed Compensation^2

Claimed Punitive

Constant

0.461**

0.464**

-0.017
(-0.560)
0.082**
(3.230)

0.213**
(2.760)
0.305**
(4.470)
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(4.970)

(5.000)

(2.240)

(1.120)

N
5864
5864
5864
5625
Adj R2 or Pseudo R2
0.1283
0.1283
0.0695
0.0708
Year Indicator Variables
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Note. Dependent variable is Compensation Ratio. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. t-statistics are
in parentheses.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
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Table 4
Ideology of Arbitrators
Panel A
Political Party of Attorneys

Number of Arbitrators

Percent

Democrat

57

13.5%

Republican

36

8.5%

Neither

324

78.0%

Total

422

100.0%

Panel B
Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

OLS w/ Errors
Clustered by
Arbitrator

Tobit

Logit
(Dep Var:
Award=1 if
positive award
and 0 otherwise)

-0.026
(-1.620)

-0.080*
(-2.510)

-0.248*
(-2.130)

Attorney
Democrat Attorney

0.049**
(2.640)

0.111**
(3.170)

0.284**
(2.860)

Republican Attorney

-0.007
(-0.310)

0.023
(0.530)

0.223
(1.620)

Attorney_Investor (Few Cases)

-0.013
(-0.390)

-0.050
(-0.890)

-0.248
(-1.190)

Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases)

0.004
(0.100)

0.010
(0.190)

0.071
(0.480)

Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)

-0.026
(-0.430)

-0.067
(-0.640)

-0.266
(-0.690)

Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)

-0.098**
(-4.880)

-0.255**
(-3.480)

-0.628**
(-5.110)

Industry Arbitrator Background

-0.048+
(-1.770)

-0.133*
(-2.430)

-0.343*
(-2.210)

Inexperienced

-0.034+
(-1.850)

-0.068
(-1.540)

-0.063
(-0.510)

Constant

0.471**
(5.010)

0.442*
(2.270)

0.709
(1.030)

N
Adj R2 or Pseudo R2

5863
0.1296

5863
0.0704

5624
0.0723
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Subject Matter Controls
Yes
Yes
Opinion Controls
Yes
Yes
State Controls
Yes
Yes
Year Indicator Variables
Yes
Yes
Note. Dependent variable is Compensation Ratio. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.
in parentheses.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
t-statistics are
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Table 5
Arbitration Chair
Variables

Model 1
OLS w/ Errors
Clustered by
Arbitrator

Model 2
Tobit

Model 3
Logit
(Dep Var:
Award=1 if
positive award
and 0 otherwise)

-0.025
(-1.280)

-0.086*
(-2.190)

-0.298*
(-2.240)

Chair_Attorney

0.127**
(3.260)

0.300**
(2.610)

-0.013
(-0.520)

0.008
(0.160)

0.212
(1.380)

Chair_Attorney_Investor (Few Cases)

0.016
(0.370)

0.022
(0.330)

-0.120
(-0.480)

Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases)

0.016
(0.410)

0.044
(0.740)

0.144
(0.770)

Chair_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)

-0.052
(-0.820)

-0.134
(-1.130)

-0.327
(-0.690)

Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)

-0.091**
(-3.750)

-0.236**
(-2.830)

-0.584**
(-3.990)

Chair_Industry_Arb_Background

-0.083*
(-2.400)

-0.199*
(-2.400)

-0.307
(-1.210)

Chair_Atty_Rated

-0.017
(-1.110)

-0.048
(-1.620)

-0.112
(-1.230)

Chair_Atty_Top_LawSchool

0.036
(1.570)

0.087+
(1.930)

0.189
(1.180)

Chair_Atty_Securities_Practice

0.001
(0.050)

0.018
(0.410)

0.037
(0.260)

Chair_Atty_Solo_Practice

0.009
(0.640)

0.027
(0.970)

0.095
(1.090)

-0.024
(-0.970)

-0.057
(-1.020)

-0.207
(-1.190)

Other_Democrat_Attorney

0.017
(0.530)

0.038
(0.470)

0.247
(1.130)

Other_Republican_Attorney

0.010
(0.190)

0.057
(0.600)

0.288
(1.330)

Chair_Democrat_Attorney
Chair_Republican_Attorney

Other_Attorney

0.056**
(2.640)
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Other_Attorney_Investor (Few Cases)

-0.074
(-1.620)

-0.189
(-1.490)

-0.443
(-1.370)

Other_Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases)

-0.037
(-0.660)

-0.088
(-0.720)

-0.093
(-0.260)

Other_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)

0.126
(1.190)

0.308
(1.190)

0.347
(0.770)

Other_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)

-0.103*
(-2.200)

-0.258
(-1.590)

-0.649**
(-2.610)

Other_Industry_Arb_Background

-0.018
(-0.490)

-0.080
(-1.110)

-0.362+
(-1.940)

Other_Atty_Rated

0.008
(0.350)

0.037
(0.650)

0.180
(1.160)

Other_Atty_Top_LawSchool

0.030
(0.700)

0.046
(0.500)

0.000
(0.000)

Other_Atty_Securities_Practice

0.002
(0.060)

-0.070
(-0.720)

-0.372
(-1.510)

-0.016
(-0.700)

-0.047
(-0.880)

-0.075
(-0.490)

-0.032
(-1.760)

-0.067
(-1.500)

-0.061
(-0.480)

0.469
(2.390)

0.804
(1.160)

Other_Atty_Solo_Practice
Inexperienced
Constant

0.479**
(5.130)

N
5858
5858
5620
Adj R2
0.1295
0.0718
0.0738
Subject Matter Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Opinion Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
State Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Indicator Variables
Yes
Yes
Yes
Note. Dependent variable is Compensation Ratio. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. t-statistics are
in parentheses.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
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Table 6
Small Sample Summary Statistics
Panel A
Year

Freq.

Percent

1998

155

36.1

1999

134

31.2

2000

140

32.6

Total

429

100.0

Panel B
Variable
Claimed Comp. ($ millions)

0.307

0.048

0.090

0.232

Standard
Deviation
1.042

Compensation Ratio

0.373

0.000

0.200

0.815

0.408

Inexperienced (Chair)

0.112

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.315

11.8

3.0

8.0

16.0

12.6

Respondent Failed to Appear

0.223

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.417

Punitive Damages

0.095

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.294

CRD Expungement

0.102

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.303

Claimant Attorney Present

0.865

1.000

1.000

1.000

0.342

Respondent Attorney Present

0.826

1.000

1.000

1.000

0.380

Number of Hearings

5.3

3.0

4.0

7.0

4.2

Opinion Length

4.6

4.0

4.0

5.0

1.1

0.095

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.294

43383.1

39927.0

43393.0

47493.0

4171.1

232935.2

217790.0

228080.0

285120.0

29254.3

Number of Prior Awards (Chair)

Top Accused Brokerage
Median State Income (1999)
Median Partner Income (1999)

Mean

25%

Median

75%
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Table 7
Small Sample Arbitrator Coalitions
Variables

Chair_Attorney
Chair_Democrat_Attorney
Chair_Republican_Attorney

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

OLS w/ Errors
Clustered by
Arbitrator

OLS w/ Errors
Clustered by
Arbitrator

OLS w/ Errors
Clustered by
Arbitrator

-0.005
(-0.100)

-0.006
(-0.130)

-0.006
(-0.130)

0.025
(0.550)

0.024
(0.510)

-0.085+
(-1.730)

-0.082+
(-1.660)

Chair_Democrat_Attorney
No Coalition

0.024
(0.520)

Chair_Republican_Attorney
No Coalition

-0.077
(-1.490)

Chair_Republican_Attorney
With Coalition

-0.167*
(-2.120)

Chair_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)
Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)

0.039
(0.630)
-0.132*
(-2.220)

Chair_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)
No Coalition

0.030
(0.470)

0.030
(0.470)

Chair_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)
With Coalition

0.123
(0.940)

0.123
(0.940)

Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)
No Coalition

-0.068
(-1.330)

-0.069
(-1.330)

Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)
With Coalition

-0.219*
(-2.230)

-0.222*
(-2.250)

Chair_Industry_Arbitrator_Background

-0.058
(-0.930)

-0.058
(-0.930)

-0.058
(-0.930)

Top Accused Brokerage Firm

-0.141**
(-3.260)

-0.146**
(-3.310)

-0.146**
(-3.310)

Inexperienced

-0.036
(-0.740)

-0.033
(-0.660)

-0.033
(-0.660)

0.103*
(2.100)

0.099*
(1.990)

0.100*
(2.000)

-0.203**
(-3.150)

-0.202**
(-3.110)

-0.202**
(-3.100)

Claimant Attorney Present
Respondent Attorney Present
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Constant

0.532*
(2.000)

0.534*
(2.010)

0.544*
(2.010)

N
390
390
390
Adj R2
0.3015
0.2986
0.2969
Subject Matter Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Opinion Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
State Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Note. Dependent variable is Compensation Ratio. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. t-statistics are
in parentheses. Note that the variable Chair_Democrat_Arbitrator w/ Coalition with Other Arbitrators was
0 for all observations and was dropped from the model.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
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Table 8
The Effect of Reforms on Arbitrator Incentives
Variables

Model 1
Full Sample

OLS w/ Errors
Clustered by
Arbitrator

Model 2
Pre-1998
Arbitrators
Only
OLS w/ Errors
Clustered by
Arbitrator

Model 3
Full Sample

Model 4
Full Sample

Tobit Random
Effects
(Arbitrator)

Logit
(Dep Var:
Award=1 if
positive award
and 0
otherwise)

Post 1998 Reforms

-0.046**
(-3.090)

-0.043**
(-2.830)

-0.074**
(-2.730)

0.018
(0.170)

Post 2004 Reforms

0.001
(0.020)

-0.007
(-0.190)

-0.033
(-0.370)

-0.133
(-0.550)

-0.059**
(-2.840)

-0.078**
(-3.490)

-0.106*
(-2.360)

-0.167
(-1.030)

0.515**
(3.060)

0.489**
(2.870)

Inexperienced
Constant

0.521**
(2.950)

-0.885**
(-0.810)

N
5196
4806
5196
4866
Adj R2
0.2096
0.1961
--0.1339
Arbitrator Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Subject Matter Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Opinion Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
State Controls
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Note. Dependent variable is Compensation Ratio. The models exclude arbitrations started in the years
1998 and 2004. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. t-statistics are in parentheses.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
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